The opinion forming process in a social network could be naturally modeled as an opinion influencing and updating dynamics. This already attracted researchers interest a while ago in mathematical sociology, and recently in theoretical computer science. In so-called opinion formation games, when underlying networks are directed, a bounded price of anarchy is only known for weighted Eulerian graphs, which may not be the most general class of directed graphs that give a bounded price of anarchy. Thus, we aim to bound the price of anarchy for games with directed graphs more general than weighted Eulerian graphs in this paper.
Introduction
In a society or community, individuals and their relationships form a social network. For some matter that each individual gets to express her own opinion about, individuals influence each others regarding it through such social network. For example, the matter can be adopting a new innovation/product, and the individuals are potential users/consumers while their opinions could be tendency to adopt the innovation or the preference toward the product; for some political issue that may need public consensus, the public have different opinions or thoughts about it. In any case, an individual is often affected by her friends/neighbors in the social network when making up her mind. The opinion forming process in a social network can be naturally thought as an opinion influencing and updating dynamics. This already attracted researchers' interest a while ago in mathematical sociology, and recently in theoretical computer science.
DeGroot [6] modeled the opinion formation process by associating each individual with a numeric-value opinion and letting the opinion be updated by weighted averaging the opinions of her friends and her own, where the weights represent how much she is influenced by her friends. This update dynamics will converge to a fixed point in which all individuals hold the same opinions, i.e., a consensus. However, we can easily observe that in the real world, the consensus is difficult to be reached. Friedkin and Johnson [7] differentiated an expressed opinion that each individual in the networks updates through time and an internal opinion that each individual is born with and stays unchanged. Thus, an individual would be always influenced by her inherent belief, and the dynamics converges to an unique equilibrium, which may not be a consensus.
Bindel et al. [3] viewed the updating rule mentioned above equivalently as each player updating her expressed opinion to minimize her quadratic individual cost function, which consists of the disagreement between her expressed opinion and those of her friends, and the difference between her expressed and internal opinions. They analyzed how socially good or bad the system can be at equilibrium compared to the optimum solution in terms of the price of anarchy [9] , i.e., the ratio of the social cost at the worst equilibrium 1 to the optimum social cost. The price of anarchy is at most 9/8 tight in undirected graphs and is unbounded in directed graphs (due to a star graph with a center only influencing the others but is not influenced at all by the others, or even directed bounded-degree trees with degrees high enough). Nevertheless, a bounded price of anarchy can be obtained for weighted Eulerian graphs, in particular, a tight upper bound of 2 for directed cycles and an upper bound of d + 1 for d-regular graphs. Another work closely related to that of Bindel et al. is by Bhawalkar et al. [2] . The individual cost functions are assumed to be "locally-smooth" in the sense of [12] and may be more general than quadratic, for example, convex. The price of anarchy for undirected graphs with quadratic cost functions is at most 2. They also allowed social networks to change by letting players choose k-nearest neighbors through opinion updates and bounded the price of anarchy. On the other hand, Chierichetti et al. [5] considered the games with discrete preferences, where an expressed and internal opinions are chosen from a discrete set and distances measuring "similarity" between opinions correspond to costs.
When graphs are directed, a bounded price of anarchy is only known for weighted Eulerian graphs where the total incoming weights equal to the total outgoing weights at each node [3, 2] , which may not be the most general class of directed graphs that give a bounded price of anarchy. Thus, we are interested to bound the price of anarchy for games with directed graphs more general than weighted Eulerian graphs (even with just quadratic individual cost functions) in this paper. 2 We first bound the price of anarchy for a more general class of directed graphs with conditions intuitively meaning that each node does not influence the others more than she is influenced by herself and the others, where the bounds depend on such influence differences (in a ratio). This generalizes the previous results on directed graphs, and recovers and matches the previous bounds in some specific classes of (directed) Eulerian graphs. We then show that there exists an example that just slightly violates the conditions with an unbounded price of anarchy. We further propose more research directions in the discussions and future work.
Preliminaries
We describe a social network as a weighted graph (G, w) for directed graph G = (V, E) and matrix w = [w ij ] ij . The node set V of size n is the selfish players, and the edge set E is the relationships between any pair of nodes. The edge weight w ij ≥ 0 is a real number and represents how much player i is influenced by player j; note that weight w ii can be seen as a self-loop weight, i.e., how much player i influences (or is influenced by) herself. Each (node) player has an internal opinion s i , which is unchanged and not affected by opinion updates. An opinion formation game can be expressed as an instance (G, w, s) that combines weighted graph (G, w) and vector s = (s i ) i . Each player's strategy is an expressed opinion z i , which may be different from her s i and gets updated. Both s i and z i are real numbers. The individual cost function of player i is 2 , where z is the strategy profile/vector and N (i) is the set of the neighbors of i, i.e., {j : j = i, w ij > 0}. Each node minimizes her cost C i by choosing her expressed opinion z i . We analyze the game when it stabilizes, i.e., at equilibrium.
Equilibria and the Price of Anarchy
In a (pure) Nash equilibrium z, each player i's strategy is z i such that given z −i (i.e., the opinion vector of all players except i) for any other z i ,
(See the appendix for the definitions of mixed Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria.) That is equivalently for each player to update her expressed opinion by the following rule [3, 2] :
This is obtained by taking the derivative of C i w.r.t. z i , setting it to 0 for each i, and solving the equality system since very player i minimizes C i . Note that C i is continuously differentiable. The social cost function here is C(z) = i C i (z), the sum of the individual costs. Nash equilibria can be far from the (centralized) social optimum in terms of a social cost [10] . To measure the (in)efficiency of equilibria, the price of anarchy [9] is defined as the ratio of the worst equilibrium's social cost to the optimal social cost.
Local Smoothness
To bound the price of anarchy, the local smoothness framework developed by Roughgarden and Schoppmann [12] is a promising analysis technique in algorithmic game theory. It has been applied in [2] to obtain the price of anarchy bounds there and similar techniques have been used in many other games [11, 4] 3 . We briefly summarize this technique in the following, where the inequality intuitively means that summing up individual costs after some unilateral local deviations to o i 's from strategy profile z would be still upper bounded. Definition 1. A cost-minimization game is (λ,µ)-locally smooth if, with a cost function C i continuously differentiable w.r.t. player i's strategy, for fixed strategy profile o and parameters λ > 0 and µ < 1; for any strategy profile z,
We have the following from an extension theorem of [12] .
Theorem 1.
If σ is a correlated equilibrium and o is the social optimum in a (λ,µ)-locally smooth game, the correlated (thus, pure and mixed) price of anarchy,
With this, our goal becomes finding suitable λ and µ values to satisfy Inequality (1), which immediately gives price-of-anarchy bounds.
Bounds on the Price of Anarchy
We first generalize the result [3] about bounded price of anarchy that is for weighted Eulerian Graphs, in which j =i w ij = j =i w ji for all i, to consider a more general class of directed graphs with conditions intuitively meaning that each node does not influence the others more than she is influenced (by herself and the others). We then show that there exists an example that just slightly violates the conditions and gives an unbounded price of anarchy.
Theorem 2. For weighted graphs (G, w) in which for all i ∈ V and a value > 0,
the price of anarchy for games with such class of graphs is at most 1 + 1 .
To make such upper bound as tight as possible, is naturally chosen to be the largest possible value such that the inequalities for all i hold. Roughly speaking, captures a bound on how much more (as a ratio) a node is influenced by herself and the others than she influences the others.
Proof. We want to show (λ,µ)-local smoothness for opinion formation games that have weighted graphs with conditions 2. Let z be a Nash equilibrium and o the social optimum. We start by plugging the definition of C i into the left-hand side of (1) and rearrangements as follows
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality (x + y) 2 ≤ (a 2 + b 2 )( 
The inequality follows from rearranging the summations in the term with (1 + ) and adding more positive terms. By the conditions j =i w ji /(w ii + j =i w ij ) ≤ 1/(1 + ) for all i, we then have λ = 1 + 1/ and µ = 0. By Theorem 1, the upper bound of λ/(1 − µ) is 1 + 1/ .
Our bound recovers the tight bound of 2 for directed cycles in [3] Proof. Consider a directed tree in which, except the root, each node has out-degree 1 and this out-edge is directed to her parent node. Let, except the leaves, the in-degree of any node at level i be a random variable X i that is at most 2. All X i 's are independent from each other. Let p > 1 be a constant that we will decide later. We need the expectation of X i to be p, i.e., E[X i ] = p for all i. The root has self-loop weight √ p, and all the nodes at level i have self-loop weight √ p − 1 and weight 1 to her parent at level i − 1. Let the root be at level 0. At Nash equilibrium, the root expresses z (0) = 1 and has cost c (0) = 0; a node at level i expresses
is the opinion expressed by a node at level i − 1 so a node at level i expresses z (i) = p −i/2 and has cost c (i) = (
The expected social cost at Nash equilibrium is
The social optimum is at most √ p. The expected price of anarchy
is Ω(log n). Thus, there must exist a construction of tree degrees giving the price of anarchy of Ω(log n). When p approaches 1, the expected ratio of total weight influencing the others to total weight influenced is p/ √ p approaching 1 from above. On the other hand, the graph with price of anarchy Ω(log n) may have nodes with in-degree 2, those nodes have larger violation to our conditions, although the fraction of such nodes are very small; we have that the fraction of degree-2 nodes is close to p − 1 by a Chernoff bound. This means that even with the conditions (2) in Theorem 2 only slightly violated, the price of anarchy can be unbounded when n is large.
Discussions and Future Work
Given the results that we just present, an immediate extension may be to give more refined bounds for the studied class of weighted graphs or different subclasses. Another natural direction is to improve the price of anarchy with so-called "stackelberg strategies": one way to control some nodes is to make them express something that leads to approximate the optimum social cost or minimize the price of anarchy given the uncontrolled ones still expressing selfishly. If one can control an arbitrary number of nodes, a straightforward way is to control the nodes that violate conditions (2) simply making them express their opinions at social optimum and analyze the induced equilibrium reusing Theorem 2 to at least get a bounded price of anarchy. Theorem 3 implies when we can control only k nodes, k has to be at least the number of nodes violating their corresponding conditions to get a bounded price of anarchy. So, if we focus on lower bounds on the size of the controlled nodes for a bounded price of anarchy, consider √ n disconnected stars of size √ n each, where for each star all the leaf nodes (except the center) are only in influenced by the center and the center is not influenced by anyone. In this case, at least √ n centers need to be controlled or the price of anarchy bound would be unbounded. There may exist stricter lower bounds than this.
Note that although the results of [8, 1] identified some k-subset of nodes to control, just as we aim to do, we have a different social cost that is the sum of all nodes' individual costs from theirs, such as the sum of all nodes' opinions in [8] , which happens to be "submodular" and enables applicability of greedy algorithms there. Other ways to control nodes may include changing their internal opinions [1] . More broadly, designing the networks such as deleting edges (or adding edges) to perform socially better has also been briefly discussed [3] .
